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Experience has demonstrated, time and again, that the application of interna-tional humanitarian law (IHL) on the battlefield is an exercise of extreme in-
tricacy. No aspect of this body oflaw has proven more difficult to apply than that 
governing targeting-the use of force against enemy forces, material and facilities . 
Combat operations in Afghanistan since October 7, 2001, the date on which the 
United States and its coalition partners launched Operation Enduring Freedom, 
have aptly illustrated the complexity of targeting in modern warfare. 
This article examines targeting practices dur ing the Operation Enduring Free-
dom campaign through 2008, with emphasis on US operations. Specifically, it ex-
plores the role law played in the calculations of those responsible for planning, 
approving and conducting "attacks," defined in IHLas "acts of violence against the 
enemy, whether in offence or defence."l As will become apparent, their decisions 
were determined less by law than by either the operational realities of the battlefield 
or, in a Clausewitzian sense, the policy dictates underpinning the conflict. 
Reference is largely to the law applicable in international armed conflict, that is, 
the law governing hostilities between States.2 Although debate continues over 
whether the terrorist attacks of September 11, 200 1 launched a conflict of this 
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character,3 the October 7 coalition strikes against Taliban and terrorist forces based 
in Afghanistan unquestionably did so, one between Afghanistan and the States par-
ticipating in the US-led coalition.4 Arguably, the conflict became non-international 
in June 2002, when the Loya Jirga elected Hamid Karzai President of the Transi-
tional Authority, an act which the United Nations recognized as establishing legit-
imate indigenous governance over a sovereign Afghanistan.5 Today, the "war" in 
Afghanistan comprises a non-international armed conflict between the Afghan 
government (supported by foreign States) and various armed groups, most nota-
bly the remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.6 
Although the conflict has become non-international, it must be understood that 
the IHL norms governing attacks during international armed conflicts, on one 
hand, and non-international armed conflicts, on the other, have become nearly in-
distinguishable. In particular, the foundationallHL principle of distinction, which 
requires those involved in hostilities to "at all times distinguish between the civil-
ian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objec-
tives," applies equally in all conflicts? That being so, the humanitarian law 
governing international armed conflict always serves as an appropriate benchmark 
against which to measure targeting practices. 
The Operational Environment 
Afghanistan presented a multifarious environment in which to apply targeting 
law.8 The country's physical and human terrains are of unparalleled complexity. At 
nearly 650,000 square kilometers, it is roughly the size of Texas. Much of the country 
is mountainous and few roads or other means of transportation exist. The 5,500-
kilometer border is ill-defined and porous. These features often compelled US 
forces to employ airpower in lieu of ground operations. Habitation is widely scat-
tered and predominantly rural, and combatants are seldom distinguishable from 
civilians by dress. The operational result was an unusually heavy reliance on intelli-
gence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, rather than visual identi-
fication by an attacker. Complex ethnic and tribal relationships, characterized. by 
shifting alliances, complicated matters. Indeed, Afghans typically have less sense of 
identity as such than as Tajiks, Pashtuns, Hazaras, Turkmens, Uzbeks or members 
of other similar groups. In many cases, these ethnic groups straddle borders with 
Afghanistan's neighbors-Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
China. 
Perhaps most significantly, Afghanistan's recent history has been one of con-
stant warfare, from the internal conflict and ensuing Soviet invasion of 1979, 
through the Soviet withdrawal a decade later, and into the war that led to the 1996 
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Taliban victory. Defeat of the Taliban by the US-led coalition in late 2001 ushered 
in the period of hostilities considered here. Many Afghans have known nothing but 
war, and many have found themselves on both sides of the battle lines at different 
times. A massive illegal narcotics infrastructure fmancially fuels these conflicts. Af-
ghanistan is presently the world's largest producer of opium, with an output of 
eight thousand metric tons in 2008. Since unemployment runs at 40 percent, and 
in light of a per capita gross domestic product of a meager $800, both the drug trade 
and conflict offer attractive means of subsistence.9 
As noted, terrain, distance and infrastructure led the coalition forces to rely 
heavily on air attacks. Political demands for a quick response to September 11, the 
practical difficulty of rapidly deploying ground forces and fear of repeating the disas-
trous Soviet experience fu rther led to an emphasis on air operations.IO During the 
initial phase of hostilities, friendly indigenous armed groups, supported by US and 
coalition special forces, shouldered responsibility for most ground operations. 
However, once the conflict morphed into a classic insurgency, ground operations 
assumed increasing importance. Nevertheless, air attack remains a dominant fea-
ture of the war in Afghanistan. 
Targeting in a Counterinsurgency 
Within months, the conflict in Afghanistan became an insurgency in which tradi-
tional methods of warfare no longer sufficed. I I As US military doctrine recognizes, 
the application of force to defeat an insurgency must be but part of a broader strategy 
that incorporates paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions. 
The application of a purely military approach to irregular warfare [JWI has not proved 
successful in the past. JW is about winning a war of ideas and perception. Its battles are 
fought amongst the people and its outcomes are determined by the perceptions and 
support of the people. The campaign must change the perception and offer viable 
alternatives. rather than specifically kill an enemy or destroy his resources in 
isolation. 12 
This reality necessitates carefully measured use of force, lest the complementary 
components of the strategy suffer. The current US counterinsurgency (COIN) 
manual accordingly cautions, 
[a I ny use of force generates a series of reactions . ... Counterinsurgents should calculate 
carefully the type and amount of force to be applied and who wields it for any 
operation. An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral 
damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents . ... [Thus.1 it is vital fo r 
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commanders to adopt appropriate and measured levels of force and apply that force 
precisely so that it accomplishes the mission without causing unnecessary loss oflife or 
suffering. n 
Sensitivity to the reverberating consequences of an attack that causes civilian casu-
alties lies at the heart of counterinsurgency strategy, for "using substantial force .. . 
increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military ac-
tivities as brutal, [while 1 using force precisely and discrim inateiy strengthens the 
rule oflaw that needs to be established. "14 
Ultimately, the key is legitimacy with the population, the support of which con-
stitutes the ultimate objective of all counterinsurgencies. The term "legitimacy" 
unsurprisinglyappears 131 times in the COIN manual. In 2008, it was elevated to a 
"principle of war" for US joint operations. Along with perseverance and restraint, 
similarly relevant in the context of targeting, legitimacy joined the nine traditional 
principles: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of com-
mand, security, surprise and simplicity.IS 
The legitimacy imperative undergirds US targeting doctrine. As an example, the 
Air Force requires consideration of the following factors during the "target valida-
tion" phase of planning. 16 
• Does the target meet [combined fo rce air component commander] or higher 
commanders' objectives, guidance, and intent? 
Is the target consistent with [law of anned conflict] and [rules of engagement]? 
Is the desired effect on the target consistent with the end state? 
Is the target politically or culturally "sensitive?" 
• What will the effect of striking it be on public opinion (enemy, friendly, and 
neutral)? 
What are the risks and likely consequences of collateral damage? 
Is it feasible to attack this target? What is the risk? 
Is it feasible to attack the target at this time? 
What are the consequences of not attacking the target? 
Will attacking the target negatively affect friendly operations due to current or 
planned friendly exploitation of the target? 
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Clearly, counterinsurgency targeting planners must be especially sensitive to issues 
beyond the immediate military utility of a strike and the legal norms governing it. 
The collateral damage estimate methodology (CDEM) employed by us forces 
reflects this sensitivity.17 "Collateral damage" refers to incidental injury to civil-
ians and damage to civilian objects caused during an attack on a lawful target. 
CDEM sets forth "standardized procedures for determining potential collateral 
damage, options available to mitigate that damage, and approval authorities for 
strikes based on the anticipated collateral damage during the conduct of opera-
tions. "18 Although the precise parameters of CDEM are classified, in general terms 
the methodology involves using computer-assisted modeling, intelligence analy-
sis, weaponeering and human vetting to assess likely collateral damage and deter-
mine the level at which a preplanned strike must be approved. 19 lt further requires 
particular caution when attacking dual-use targets, when employing duster mu-
nitions or when civilians are present within military objectives. 
The Law of Targeting in Brief 
The law of targeting is, from a theoretical and undeconstructed perspective, fairly 
straightforward.20 Consistent with the principle of distinction, attacks may only be 
conducted against military objectives, including members of the armed forces and 
other organized armed groups participating in the conflict.21 Objects which by 
"nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action 
and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circum-
stances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage" qualify as military 
objectives.22 By the "use" criterion, civilian objects may become military objectives 
when the enemy employs them for military ends. Analogously, civilians may be 
targeted shou1d they "directly participate in hostilities. "23 Attacks must not be in-
discriminate; that is, they must be directed against a specific military objective and 
may not treat "as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and dis-
tinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a 
similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects. "24 
When engaging a lawful target, the attacker may be barred from employing cer-
tain weapons. Such restrictions derive either from the customary law forbidding 
the employment of indiscriminate weapons2S and those which cause unnecessary 
suffering or superfluous injury,26 or from specific treaty restrictions, such as the 
Dublin Treaty on cluster munitions, for States partyP 
Even assuming a lawful target and permitted weapon, an attacker must take 
"feasible precautions" to minimize collateral damage. Specifically, "the com-
mander must decide, in light of all the facts known or reasonably available to him, 
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including the need to conserve resources and complete the mission successfully, 
whether to adopt an alternative method of attack, if reasonably available, to reduce 
civilian casualties and damage. " 28 Considerations indude weapon and tactic op-
tions, as well as alternative targets that can be attacked to attain a "similar military 
advantage." 
Finally, attacks that violate the principle of proportionality are unlawful. An at-
tack will breach the standard if it is "expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage antici-
pated."29 The rule of proportionality is often misconstrued as either prohibiting 
"extensive" collateral damage or as a test which balances collateral damage against 
military advantage. In fact, it bars attack only when no proportionality at all exists 
between the ends sought and the expected harm to civilians and civilian objects. 
Restated, the linchpin term "excessive" indicates unreasonable collateral damage 
in light of the reasonably anticipated military advantage expected to result from 
the attack 30 
Law and Targeting in Afghanistan 
That law limits targeting options is self-evident. However, the nature of a conflict 
equally affects application of the law, sometimes by necessitating policy and oper-
ational limitations that exceed those found in international humanitarian law. 
Nowhere has this dynamic been more apparent than during operations in 
Afghanistan. 
The legitimacy imperative, so prominent in counterinsurgency doctrine, was 
the driving force behind targeting practices in the conflict. Early high-visibility 
mistakes drew international attention to the US operations. Of particular note 
were two mistaken strikes on an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
warehouse in the first month of the conflict and an attack on a wedding party in 
November.3! Resultantly, the incentive to avoid future mistakes and, indeed, even 
lawful collateral damage, grew quickly. 
Intent on avoiding unintended harm to the civilian population, commanders 
imposed strict restrictions on the conduct of operations. For instance, the Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force Commander directed his forces to employ preci-
sion munitions whenever possible; humanitarian law imposes no such 
requirement. Additionally, he directed on-scene commanders to make every effort 
to ensure houses from which their troops received fire were free of innocent civil-
ians before respondingP even though, as a matter of IHL, returning fire in such 
circumstances is governed by the rule of proportionality and the requirement to 
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take feasible precautions in attack, not by the mere presence of civilians. Further, in 
2007 the United States and NATO restricted the use of airstrikes during troops-in-
contact (TIC) situations, often opting for withdrawal rather than engagement. US 
forces also increasingly employed small-diameter bombs (low-collateral-damage 
bombs). Again, IH L would not necessarily mandate such practices. 
Despite such efforts, civilian casualties continued to occur. H uman Rights 
Watch estimates that in 2007 over 1,600 civilians were killed in the conflict. Nine 
hundred fifty died as a result of Taliban and AI Qaeda actions, whereas 434 of the 
casualties were attributable to US and NATO actions (3 12 in airstrikes and 113 
during ground action). Another fifty-seven died in crossfire between the warring 
parties and the circumstances surrounding the deaths of 192 were unclear.33 
President Karzai, struggling with the public-opinion fallout of civilian casualties, 
repeatedly addressed the issue, Following a particularly tragic attack in 2007 that 
killed fifty-one civilians, he stated that while "the intention is very good in these 
operations to figh t terrorism . .. five years on, it is very difficult for us to continue 
to accept civilian casualties.":J.t Karzai contin ues to demand greater care in execut-
ing attacks endangering civilians. 
A number of obstacles dramatically hindered attempts to avoid collateral dam-
age. The enemy was scattered across the country and often operated in small 
groups. The non-linear nature of this battlespace meant that operations had to be 
conducted over vast areas in which the mere position of a group, vehicle or other 
mobile target seldom served as a reliable indicator of its enemy character. More-
over, because neither the Taliban nor AI Qaeda fielded a classic military force, with 
corresponding fixed military facilities, coalition fo rces quickly exhausted known 
targets, thereby necessitating a shift to !leeting targets, which were harder to iden-
tify because of time constraints. Most targeting consequently became "dynamic." 
In dynamic targeting, targets are passed to aircraft already airborne as hostile 
forces are identified, thereby limiting the opportunity for comprehensive target 
analysis, and requiring use of whatever weapons the aircraft happen to be armed 
with at the time. 
The difficul ty of identifying the enemy complicated matters. Enemy forces wore 
no uniforms or other distinctive clothing that allowed immediate visual identifica-
tion. Merely being armed was an insufficient indicator, as Afghans in remote areas 
often carry weapons for protection, and because friendly indigenous armed groups 
were usually indistinguishable from the Taliban and AI Qaeda. General T. Michael 
Mosely, the combined force air component commander, highlighted the opera-
tional murkiness when he noted that "in any given space-ground space--out 
there, you had regular and unconventional forces, humanitarian assistance guys, 
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maybe regular guys and not one of us in the command authority knew where all 
those guys were. "35 
Determined to avoid incidents which might delegitimize their operations, US 
and coalition forces imposed wide-ranging targeting restrictions through myriad 
mechanisms. These included coalition and national rules of engagement (ROE),3/) 
no-strike lists (for reasons such as IHL or host-nation sensitivities), restricted tar-
get lists (in which attack requires special preapproval, e.g., due to negative cultural 
implications), individual target folder37 restrictions (such as a requirement to use a 
particular munition or str ike a particular "desired point of impact"), loint Air Op-
erations Plans,38 execute orders,39 fragmentary orders,40 fire support coordination 
measures41 and soldier cards.42 The net result was a dense and oft confusing nor-
mative environment, one in which IHL played a minor role relative to policy and 
operational considerations.43 
Such restrictions deviated measurably from customary practices attendant to 
attacks on individuals. The traditional approach in conventional conflict is 
straightforn'ard. Typically, enemy armed fo rces, including organized armed 
groups supporting the enemy, are "declared hostile," either at the outset of the 
conflict or, in the latter case, once their involvement in the conflict becomes evi-
dent. Declaring fo rces hostile operationalizes the principle of distinction, which 
permits attacks on combatants. It matters not whether the combatants are threat-
ening the attacker, or even whether they represent a potential threat; status alone 
renders them a lawful target. For instance, an unarmed cook may be attacked on 
sight ifhe or she is a member of the armed forces. 
By the principle of distinction, civilians may not be attacked unless, and for such 
time as, they directly participate in hostilities.« Accordingly, although they may 
not be declared hostile per se, rules of engagement and other targeting guidance al-
low them to be attacked while engaging in actions that constitute direct participa-
tion. Much controversy exists over the reach of the qualifying activities, as well as 
the meaning of the phrase "for such time." These issues will be dealt with later; the 
point here is that it is customary for targeting guidance to permit attacks on direct 
participants. 
Beyond declaring fo rces hostile and incorporating direct participation into the 
ROE, the third typical form of engagement authority addresses violence with no 
nexus to the confli ct---criminal acts. Soldiers faced with such criminality may em-
ploy force consistent with the law of self-defense (and defense of others). Spe-
cifically, they may use deadly force to protect themselves and others against an 
imminent threat of death or serious injury, when less extreme measures are un-
available.4$ Operationally, the US rules of engagement provide that US military 
personnel may use force in the face of a hostile act or a demonstration of hostile 
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intent.46 They may only do so when force is the sole viable option for addressing the 
situation (principle of necessity). No more force than that required to repel the at-
tack, or prospective attack, is permitted. 
This typical three-tiered paradigm was notably altered during operations in Af-
ghanistan. Although targeting practices shifted somewhat over time to meet 
emerging battlefield realities, in broad terms they have been re1atively constant. 
When the conflict began, the United States and its coali tion partners declared no 
enemy forces hostile, to include the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Instead, the "enemy" 
had to represent a "likely and identifiable threat" (LIT) before being attacked. 
Those not meeting this standard could only be engaged if they had committed a 
hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent, the self-defense rule traditionally em-
ployed to respond to actions unconnected to the hostilities. During Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, by contrast, the Iraqi military was declared hostile from the outset of hos-
tilities. Similarly, "designated terrorist groups" cou1d generally be engaged in the 
same fashion.47 
Afghanistan represented the first use of the LIT standard in an armed conflict. It 
was less permissive than the practice of declaring forces hostile because potential 
targets had to manifest some degree of threat. Paradoxically, the standard was 
more permissive than the designated-terrorist-group approach applicable in Iraq 
because it included no status criterion, i.e., circumstances alone justified engage-
ment even in the absence of intelligence as to membership. 
The adoption of this untested approach to engagement authority begs the ques-
tion of why the standard declaration of forces hostile, combined with direct partici-
pation and self-defense ROE, was judged insufficient. Apparently, concern over 
the liberality of declaring fo rces hostile, combined with apprehension over the po-
tential for friend1y-fire incidents, underpinned the standard. According to one key 
participant in its deve10pment at US Central Command (CENTCOM), the mili-
tary headquarters for Afghanistan and Iraq operations, 
I intentionally designed it to allow the guys in contact (Ground Forces) the ability to 
engage the "enemy," such as they were, without actually being shot at first, while at the 
same time limiting the ability of the guys flying at 21,000 feet and 210 knots to drop 
bombs everywhere they wanted (potentially on our allies). A$ you know, when we 
began operations targets (deliberate targets) were intentionally held at the highest 
levels and this was a way to provide some flexibili ty to the guy in the field. "$elf Defense 
Plus" is how I describe it. In theory, this gave the Air Force the ability to strike as well 
(e.g. SAM batteries, anti-aircraft guns. etc). Based on the "OPLAN" I knew there would 
be people (ally and enemy alike) all over the country that looked exactly the same 
(white robeslturbans[,] on horses/pickup trucks. etc). 
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Identification of the enemy was everything during this conflict. There wasn' t even a 
FLOT lforward line of own troops]. Eventually, the best we could do was create small 
zones/boxes where we could say none of our people were located. You simply couldn't 
tell who the enemy was from the lawn darts [slang for an F-16] and this was a way of 
empowering the guys in contact to shoot or call air strikes based upon "Positive 
Identification" (the totality of the circumstances). And, even with these tight rules the 
conflict didn't go without incidenl.48 
The less candid, but official, CENTCOM explanation focused on the conflict's 
unique nature. Central Command was intent on maintaining strict control over 
attacks because it well understood the downside of collateral damage during an 
insurgency. Recall also the difficulties of verifying targets, both because identifi-
cation based solely on appearance was problematic and because it was often diffi-
cult to determine to which side the various armed groups owed their allegiance at 
any particular time. With its comprehensive access to ISR assets, and fuller grasp 
of operational and strategic considerations, CENTCOM believed that it was best 
situated to distinguish friendly from hostile targets. 
Yet, the command realized that a conflict of this magnitude required more 
than self-defense rules. One scenario cited to justify the new standard involved 
US forces encountering sleeping Taliban soldiers; another posited aircraft spot-
ting anti-aircraft systems along the route of attack. Self-defense rules alone would 
not permit attack in such situations. and it clearly would make no sense for sol-
diers in the field or airborne aircraft to have to "call home" for engagement autho-
rization, merely because these lucrative targets were neither committing a hostile 
act nor demonstrating hostile intent. For CENTCOM, the answer lay in the LIT 
standard . .f9 
The level of certainty required to determine that a target qualified as a likely and 
identifiable threat was also a novel feature. at least in ground operations. Likely and 
identifiable threat required more than merely "suspicious people in a questionable 
location."so Rather. the rules of engagement mandated positive identification 
(PID) of the target as a threat before attacking it. Previously. this standard had only 
been applied in the no-fly-zone-enforcement context of Operations Northern and 
Southern Watch.51 Afghanistan represented its first use in ground operations. and 
it unsurprisinglycaused confusio n. The meaningofPID was eventually clarified in 
an unclassified format during Operation Iraqi Freedom on the Combined Forces 
Land Component ROE Card: "PID is a reasonable certainty that the proposed tar-
get is a legitimate mili tary target. "52 Interestingly, PID had meant something much 
more in the no- Oy-zone context-almost a no-mistakes standard.53 
Accounts from soldiers and airmen , as well as judge advocates, indicate that LIT 
generated confusion, in great part because it was not a standard to which combat 
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forces had trained. Numerous subordinate commands urged CENTCOM to issue 
guidance.54 The new terminology also elevated form over substance, at least to an 
extent. For instance, 
[rJeservations of targeting authority to higher levels made it extremely important fo r 
team members calling for fifes to use the right terms to avoid any delays. In addition to 
using terms like "positively identified" and "likely and identifiable threat" in the 
request, the team members needed to indicate the situation requiring the fires so that 
the approval was obtained at the most immediate level possible.55 
One US officer cut to the chase: "'When lawyers can easily argue about what [LIT[ 
means or doesn 't mean as far as engaging targets, we have failed[, [ because the 21-
year-old corporal doesn't have the luxury of such an academic exercise."56 
Likely and identifiable threat represented a standard exceeding that required by 
the relevant norms of international humanitarian law. Most significantly, it re-
jected the universally accepted premise that combatants, whether members of the 
armed forces or of other organized armed groups, can be attacked on sight. Under 
IHL, their mere status as combatants rendered them targetable. By contrast, act (or 
imminent act) replaced status in the LIT standard. 
LIT is a genre of the direct participation in hostilitie5--Qne without an express 
"for such time" component. This should be unsurprising, since the absence of classic 
conventional operations by the Taliban and Al Qaeda, combined with the difficulty 
of identifying fighters as members of a particular group, meant that application of 
the direct-participation notion, in some fonn, was destined to loom large. 
As mentioned earlier, disagreement exists over the scope of direct participation. 
For instance, while all agree that conducting an attack and gathering tactical intelli-
gence qualify, disagreement prevails as to whether directly financing insurgents 
docs. An ICRC-sponsored multiyear project to clarify matters is nearing comple-
tion. Although the final interpretive guidance on direct participation has yet to be 
released, indications are that three cumulative criteria will emerge. 57 
The act in question must first adversely affect (or be likely to do so) enemy mili-
tary operations or capacity, or harm civilians or civilian objects. Second, there must 
be a direct causal link between the act and the harm caused the enemy, or the harm 
must derive from a coordinated military operation of which the act is an integral 
part. This causality criterion excludes actions that may contribute in some way to 
the enemy's military efforts, but which do not directly enhance its combat actions. 
Finally, the act must be designed to negatively affect the enemy in support of its op-
ponent. This belligerent nexus requirement would exclude mere criminality un-
connected to the conflict. The LIT standard meets all three criteria: the threat is to 
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US forces, the anticipated actions amount to hostile activity and the forces acting 
are not mere criminals. 
The absence of a "for such time" element in LIT raises several legal issues. Before 
discussing them, it is useful to recall that they are not raised as to any individuals 
who are members of an organized armed force, for, as noted, members of such 
groups may be attacked regardless of whether they are directly participating.58 
There is no temporal issue-as a matter oflaw-vis-a-vis them. 
Those who are not members of an organized armed group, but meet the direct 
participation scope threshold, may only be attacked "for such time" as they directly 
participate in the hostilities. The notion of "for such time" is the source of much 
contention. The ICRC Commentary to the relevant provision of Additional Proto-
col I, Article 51.3, provides that direct participation includes "preparations for 
combat and rcturn from combat," but that " [o] nce he ceases to participate, the ci-
vilian regains his right to the protection .... "59 Individuals who have not set out to 
attack their enemy are immune from attack; those who manage to make it home 
following an operation regain civilian protection until they set out on another op-
eration. Certain experts of the working group on direct participation embraced the 
strict approach set forth in this non-binding commentary. 
Other experts point out that this narrow approach creates a "revolving door" 
through which the direct participant passes as he or she begins and completes each 
mission.60 They propose an alternative which locks the door after exit: once an in-
dividual has optcd into the hostilities, he or she remains targetable until unambig-
uously opting out. Opting out can occur either through extended non-
participation demonstrating an intention to desist from further involvement, or an 
affirmative act of withdrawal. Although it may be difficult to determine whether a 
potential target has opted out, since the individual did not enjoy any privilege to 
engage in hostilities in the first place, it is reasonable that he or she bear the risk that 
the other side is unaware of withdrawal. 
This is the better interpretation of direct participation. In international hu-
manitarian law, gray areas must be interpreted in light of the law's underlying 
purposes-achieving balance between military necessity and humanitarian con-
cerns.6! A revolving door would throw off this balance. It would frustrate combat-
ants charged with combating the direct participants. and combatants frustrated 
with legal norms constitute a risk to the civilian population. Additionally, the re-
strictive approach would paradoxically create a situation in which those entitled to 
use fo rce-lawful combatants-would enjoy less protection than those not so enti-
tled but nevertheless doing so; the former could be attacked at any time. whereas 
the latter could only be attacked while deploying to and from an operation and 
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during the operation itself. From a military necessity perspective, enemy direct 
participants would unacceptably enjoy a temporal sanctuary.62 
The LIT standard runs counter to the revolving-door interpretive approach. For 
instance, the approach begs the question of how one responds to the sleeping-
fighters scenario posed by those responsible for LIT's adoption. By strict applica-
tion of the revolving-door approach, the sleeping fighters could not be engaged. 
LIT imposes no such constraint. Albeit sleeping, the fighters are a likely and identi-
fiable threat. There need be no debate as to whether their sleeping falls within the 
confines of deploying to or from an operation. By contrast, the alternative liberal 
interpretation of direct participation tracks LIT neatly. Both allow attack in this 
and similar situations in which the direct participant is taking a tactical pause. In-
deed, these are precisely the sorts of scenarios posed by critics of the revolving-door 
approach to convincingly point out its impracticality. 
As can be seen, LIT is roughly comparable to the liberal standard of direct par-
ticipation.63 Yet, beyond questions as to the scope of the standard lies the issue of 
certainty. With LIT, individuals m ust be positively identified as likely threats be-
fore being attacked. This requirement poses a number of practical and legal ques-
tions. Central among them is the requisite type and degree of certainty. What does 
"positive" mean in practice? How positive? Beyond a reasonable doubt? More 
likely than not? And does positive identification mean that the individual in ques-
tion is likely to be a potential threat or, instead, likely to actually threaten? 
Consider the requirement's application on the bewildering battlefield that is Af-
ghanistan. What indicators should suffice in making a positive identification? Per-
haps carrying weapons? Yet, many non-participants carried weapons in Afghanistan 
for self-protection. Perhaps the weapons (e.g., crew-served weapons) evidenced 
their status as a threat. However, recall that there were friendly indigenous forces 
armed with the same type of weapons, and that identity and allegiances were diffi-
cult to discern. And what type of intelligence should be required to determine that 
someone was a likely and identifiable threat? Many were available in Afghanistan, 
but which sufficed? Satellite imagery, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) imagery 
transmitted in real time, human eyes on target, cell phone intercepts, human intel-
ligence? Finally, there is the critical matter of whether positive identification is con-
textual. That is, does the criterion represent a constant in low- and high-risk 
environments, or does high risk lower the threshold necessary for positive identifi-
cation? In Afghanistan, both environments existed at various times and places. 
Uncertainty is hardly a novel phenomenon on the battlefield. That being so, 
States have tended to mandate the only level of certainty that is practicable in the 
fog of war-would a reasonable warfighter in the same circumstances hesitate to 
act? The US position is representative. The Commander's Ha1ldbook on tile Law of 
319 
Targeting and International Humanitarian Law in Afghan istan 
Naval Operations provides that" [c]ombatants in the field must make an honest de-
termination as to whether a particular person is or is not taking a direct part in hos-
tilities based on the person's behavior, location, and attire, and other information 
available at the time."f>4 
International humanitarian treaty law also addresses battlefield uncertainty. Ar-
ticle 50.1 of Additional Protocol 1 provides that " in case of doubt whether a person 
is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be civilian."6s Obviously, the article 
does not rule out doubt altogether. This is dear from the JCRC Commentary on the 
provision, which notes, in an example particularly appropriate to Afghanistan, " if 
combatants do not clearly distinguish themselves from the civilian population .. . , 
this could result in a weakening of the immunity granted civilians and the civilian 
population."66 Such weakening could occur only if engagement in the face of some 
doubt was contemplated by the commentary. The UK understanding accompany-
ing its ratification of the Protocol similarly adopts a contextual reading. It states 
that "the rule ... applies only in cases of substantial doubt still remaining after [the 
required assessment of the attack], and [it does not override] a commander's duty 
to protect the safety of troops under his command or to preselVe his military situa-
tion, in conformity with the other provisions of the protocoL "61 The determinative 
term is "substantial." Finally, the JCRe's Customary International Humanitarian 
Law study reasonably finds that "it is fair to conclude that when there is a situation 
of doubt, a careful assessment has to be made under the conditions and restraints 
governing a particular situation as to whether there are sufficient indications to 
warrant attack. One cannot automatically attack anyone who might appear dubi-
OUS."68 Use of the phrase "sufficient indications" suggests that absolute certainty 
was not required. 
It is unclear what LIT required beyond IHl 's "reasonable warfighter in same or 
similar circumstances" threshold. Its positive-identification requirement, absent 
clear explication to the contrary, could be interpreted as suggesting that the estab-
lished IHl frame of reference had been rejected in lieu of a more restrictive stan-
dard. But, if so, how? Complicating matters even further is the fact that the concept 
of positive identification had been adopted in other contexts. For instance, it was 
adopted for "kill or capture" operations to heighten the preconditions over those 
applying during a "capture or detain" operation.69 So, does PID mean different 
things in different types of operations? Whatever it does mean, it is clear that PlO 
was at least as restrictive as IHL-in all likelihood more so in application. 
Another aspect of targeting in Afghanistan relevant to an JHl analysis was the 
requirement that attacks be cleared at specified levels of command. As noted by 
one director of combat operations in the Combined Air Operations Center during 
Operation Anaconda, 
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[tlhe ROE was not there to go out and do a conventional fight. Under the rules of 
engagement for Operation Enduring Freedom, pre-planned strikes, interdiction 
targets and time-sensitive targets all had to be approved by USCENTCOM; and for the 
most part, the USCENTCOM/J-2 and legal advisors ... drove what we did and did not 
target.70 
His comments exemplified the concerns senior leadership had about operations 
going awry, even in the remotest of areas. 71 
This raises the issue of approval level. The Anaconda requirements exceeded 
even those found in the CDEM approval process. Yet, IHl imposes no level of 
strike approval tied to likely levels of civilian harm. In great part, this is because law 
is contextual. The degree oflawful civilian harm is determined by reference to the 
military advantage accruing from the attack in question. "Those who plan or de-
cide upon an attack" must also take feasible (practical in the circumstances) pre-
cautions in attack.72 In other words, the law lies where it falls--on those planning, 
approving or executing attacks, whoever they might be. This tightening of the re-
strictions over and above what IHL required demonstrated the extent to which Af-
ghanistan ROE and CDEM approval levels reflected an understanding that 
unintended civilian harm can have extra- normative consequences. 
The two remaining IHL issues raised by targeting operations in Afghanistan are 
the principle of proportionality and requirement to take feasible precautions in at-
tack. For a number of practical reasons, proportionality posed few concerns. From 
an operational perspective, the population was widely dispersed, engagements of-
ten occurred in remote areas and no major urban battles took place. Precision mu-
nitions were generally available when called for and intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance assets, particularly unmanned aerial vehicles, could be used to as-
sess and monitor target areas, often in real time. 
Counterinsurgency doctrine and practices also minimized the play of the pro-
portionality principle in the conflict. As noted, counterinsurgency doctrine puts a 
high premium on the avoidance of collateral damage; in Afghanistan, even attacks 
which were dearly proportionate were often avoided. However, counterinsur-
gency affects application of the principle in a Jess obvious fashion. 
In conventional operations. proportionality is usually calculated in simple utilitarian 
terms: civilian lives and property lost versus enemy destroyed and military advantage 
gained. But in COIN operations, advantage is best calculated not in terms of how many 
insurgents are killed or detained, but rather which enemies are killed or detained. If 
certain key insurgent leaders are essential to the insurgents' ability to conduct 
operations, then military leaders need to consider their relative importance when 
determining how best to pursue them. In COIN environments, the number of civilian 
lives lost and property destroyed needs to be measured against how much harm the 
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targeted insurgent could do if allowed to escape. If the target in question is relatively 
inconsequential, then proportionality requires combatants to forego [sic ] severe action, 
or seek noncombative means of engagement.73 
This extract from the COIN manual is overstated. As a matter oflaw, the mili tary 
importance of the individuals targeted is always relevant, whether in conventional 
or counterinsurgency operations. However, the fact that the goal of an insurgency 
is not attrition of enemy forces means that the military advantage of killing a simple 
fighter is likely not as high as during attrition warfare, in which victory is achieved 
through serial destruction of enemy forces. 
Reduced to basics, in Afghanistan the operational concern was the mere fact of 
collateral damage, not whether that damage expected to be caused was excessive 
relative to military advantage. Rules of engagement so embraced this casualty aver-
sion that the legal principle of proportionality never loomed large. 
The case of human shields exemplifies the extent to which, in the context of pro-
portionality, policy and operational considerations swallowed legal requirements. 
Human Rights Watch has documented the Taliban's widespread use of hwnan 
shields,'4 acts which undeniably violated international humanitarian law.'5 
Many experts correctly argue that voluntary shields are direct participants in 
hostilities who, therefore, do not factor into proportionality calculations. As to in-
voluntary shielding, the practice most prominent in Afghanistan, the weight of 
opinion holds that its victims remain civilians factored fully into any proportional-
ity analysis. 76 This approach reflects Additional Protocol I, Article 51 .8's caveat that 
"any violation of . .. [inter alia, the provision prohibiting the use of shields 1 shall 
not release the Parties to the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the 
civilian population and civilians .. . . " 77 
There have been no serious allegations that US forces ever ignored the presence 
ofhwnan shields. On the contrary, CDEM specifically mandates consideration of 
the presence of human shields; such presence elevates the required approval level. 
Recall also that rules of engagement and other operational guidelines in Afghani-
stan often required US forces to withdraw if the enemy was collocated with civil-
ians. Because US forces were already bound by policy and operational 
requirements exceeding those of IHL, the use of human shields neither compli-
cated application of the existing legal norms nor created pressure for a relaxed in-
terpretation thereof. 
Counterinsurgency operations raise a final theoretical question as to propor-
tionality: Does collateral damage directly influence the degree of military advan-
tage accruing from an attack (as distinct from the determination of whether 
collateral damage is excessive relative to mili tary advantage)? An analogous issue is 
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force protection. During Operation Allied Force, NATO aircraft flew at altitudes 
outside the threat envelope of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia air defenses. Albeit 
counterfactual. allegations surfaced that this tactic heightened risk to the civilian 
population. The affair has generated a lively academic debate over whether survival 
of the aircrew and aircraft should be considered military advantage when making 
proportionality calculations.78 
The case of Afghanistan presents the opposite case. If aircrew and aircraft sur-
vival enhance military advantage. does the counterproductive nature of collateral 
damage during a counterinsurgency detract from it? After all. avoidance of collat-
eral damage constitutes an express objective in such conflicts. 
Although it is not the place to resolve this complex issue. it is important to un-
derstand that, as a rule. military advantage is typically viewed as advantage benefit-
ing friendly operations or hindering the enemy's.79 The notion does not extend to 
winning hearts and minds, a point illustrated by agreement that destroying enemy 
civilian morale does not qualify as advantage vis-a.-vis the definition of military ob-
jective.so Rather. military advantage is purely military in nature; there must be 
some direct contribution to military operations. Political, economic or social ad-
vantage does not suffice. 
This being so, any assertion that collateral damage should diminish military ad-
vantage would have to be supported by a direct nexus to military factors . While 
true that collateral damage motivates civilian sympathy for the enemy. such gen-
eral effects are too attenuated. As a general rule, then, collateral damage plays no 
part in proportionality calculations beyond being measured against the yardstick 
of excessiveness. 
The final area of consideration is the requirement to take precautions in at-
tack. Codified in Additional Protocol I. Article 57, it requires an attacker to mini-
mize collateral damage by taking feasible steps to avoid and. in any event, 
minimize "incidental loss of civilian life. injury to civilians and damage to civilian 
objects." Precautions include both target verification and choosing among avail-
able targets. weapons and tactics so as to lessen the impact of an attack on the ci-
vilian population. 
In modern conflicts, critics increasingly condemn targeting operations for fail-
ure to comply with the requirement. This phenomenon results. in part, from the 
fact that the globalized media and non-governmental organizations. employing 
modern communications technology. have a powerful ability to focus attention on 
civilian casualties and harm to civilian objects. Collateral damage is easily grasped 
when viewed in the media; understanding the complexity of mounting a modern 
attack is not. Thus, perceptions can become distorted. 
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Further, the availability of advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnais-
sance assets, especially UAVs and precision weaponry, such as the small-diameter 
bomb,S] has created the false impression that technology makes "zero collateral 
damage" attacks possible. The result is a recurring sense that failure to take precau-
tions is the only possible explanation for civilian damage, injuries and deaths.82 
Reports on US and coalition operations in Afghanistan exemplify this tendency. 
For instance, the Human Rights Watch report on the conflict, Troops in Contact, 
asserts that "[tJhe cases described here raise concerns as to whether the attacking 
forces acted in accordance with their obligation under the laws of war to exercise 
'constant care to spare the civilian population' and take 'all feasible precautions' to 
minimize loss of civilian life."s3 
Human Rights Watch displayed a sophisticated understanding of targeting pro-
cedures during the conflict. The organization found that "when aerial bombing is 
planned, mostly against suspected Taliban targets, US and NATO forces in Af-
ghanistan have had a very good record of minimizing harm to civilians .... "84 It 
explained, 
[p Ilanned attacks allow the us and NATO to use civilian risk mitigation procedures, 
including formal risk estimates to model and minimize civilian casualties. This 
includes a "pattern of life analysis," which looks for civilians in the area for hours or 
days before an attack using "eyes on the target" ranging from ground observers to 
technical reconnaissance. According to NATO Judge AdvocateGeneral (JAG) staff, the 
US and NATO also require positive visual identification of the target during a planned 
strike, allowing the pilot to look for civilians and call off an attack based on those 
observations. Planned strikes also allow the US and NATO to develop a target over 
time, thereby using far more detailed intelligence to understand who is and is not in the 
target area.SS 
Most casualties were caused, by contrast, during non-preplanned strikes. These 
TIC situations occurred when US or coalition forces came upon the enemy unex-
pectedly. Although the rules of engagement provided that forces should withdraw 
when civilians were in the vicinity of an attack, doing so was not always possible. 
For instance, it might expose them to greater risks or the path of retreat may have 
been cut offby the enemy. The report also pointed to cases which "began as TICs 
but lasted for several hours or days, with airstrikes used to support small troop 
numbers on the ground resulting in civilian deaths."86 
Human Rights Watch expressed numerous concerns about such engagements. 
With regard to TICs that developed into prolonged battles, the organization 
opined that the resulting civilian casualties "suggest [edJ that the US is not taking 
all feasible precautions during prolonged battles, including using adequate forces 
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to minimize civilian harm, employing low-<ollateral damage bombs, and posi-
tively identifying the locations of combatants and civilians."81 It also suggested that 
while preplanned attacks involved intricate procedures to determine the presence 
of civilians, during a TIC the "tactical collateral damage assessment performed by 
the Joint Terminal Attack Controller OTAC), a service member qualified in direct-
ing airstrikes on the ground[,] is one of the only checks done, and, of necessity, 
such assessments often are made under the stress of hostile fire."68 
While Troops in emltad is the best report produced by the organization on in-
ternational humanitarian law in recent conflicts,89 its analysis of the precautions in 
attack norms misses several key points. As it did in its report on Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, Human Rights Watch appears to have imposed a rebuttable presump-
tion that collateral damage evidences a failure to take sufficient precautions in at-
tack. This shifts the burden to the attacker, who by this approach must 
demonstrate that it complied with precautions norms. That this is so is illustrated 
by a flawed tendency to allege failure to take feasible precautions without identify-
ing or developing those which were presumably available, but ignored. 
"Feasible precautions" have been defined as "precautions which are practicable 
or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, in-
cluding humanitarian and military considerations.»9O Consider the suggestions 
cited above. Albeit reasonable in the abstract, there is no support in the report for 
the proposition that they were feasible in the sense of being practical in the circum-
stances at hand. For instance, were additional troops on hand that could have been 
deployed to minimize civilian harm? Or were low-collateral-damage bombs 
readily available, either at bases from which aircraft launched or aboard the attack-
ing aircraft (since many attacks were conducted by aircraft to which targets were 
passed while already airborne)? As to the fact that only JT ACs generally had eyes on 
target, one must query what the alternative might have been. What seems to have 
been missed is that, as a matter of law, the feasible- precautions-in-attack require-
ments only apply when there are practical alternatives available to the attacker. The 
burden of demonstrating non-compliance lies with those asserting violation of the 
requirements, not the forces executing the attack. 
In contrast to the LIT criterion for engagement, self-defense was much clearer, 
since it is a standard to which US and other forces train and with which they are, 
therefore, familiar. Self-defense presents no status issues because anyone against 
whom self-defense is necessary can be engaged. Further, it poses no direct-
participation-in-hostilities concerns, because only those who are actually attack-
ing, or about to attack, are liable to being engaged defensively. Accordingly, neither 
the scope nor the timing debates infecting direct-participation analysis, and, corre-
spondingly, the LIT criterion, surface. 
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Be that as it may, even self-defense proved troublesome in Afghanistan. As is of-
ten the case with application of rules of engagement, mission accomplishment 
standards tended to slip into application of self-defense principles.91 The condition 
precedent for acting in self-defense is either a hostile act or a demonstration ofhos-
tile intent.92 For US forces, this standard is codified in the Standing Rules of En-
gagement. Both criteria reflect the self-defense concept of military necessity, by 
which force may only be used if lesser means of addressing the threat are likely not 
to suffice. 
In preparing for combat in Afghanistan, "considerable time and effort was spent 
attempting to create training packages aimed at developing a specific level ofiden-
tification before either returning fire or taking other actions in response to a hostile 
act or demonstration of hostile intent. "91 Identification has no place in self-defense 
situations, other than to locate the source of the hostile act or demonstration of 
hostile intent. It is instead an element of mission accomplishment rules of engage-
ment, by which forces are authorized to attack combatants and direct participants 
only once they have been reliably identified as such. 
It is well-accepted that intermingling mission accomplishment and self-de fense 
notions in rules of engagement risks causing those who need to act in self-defense 
to hesitate, thereby endangering themselves and others in their units. Moreover, 
US training emphasizes that there is no need to seek higher approval in self-defense 
situations, for delay may impede the ability of troops to defend themselves. It is 
only in mission accomplishment rules of engagement that engagement approval 
levels appear. Conflating the two types of rules of engagement can confuse troops 
at the tactical level, causing them to act precipitously when they should be seeking 
higher approval in a mission accomplishment engagement. 
A further self-defense complication derived from the fact that US and NATO 
forces operated in the same theater. Both used "hostile intent" as a criterion for 
employing airpower in defensive operations employing airpower.9-I However, 
NATO defined the term as "manifest and overwhelming" force, whereas the US 
standard was " the threat of imminent use of force.' '9S In other words, the NATO 
standard placed greater emphasis on the necessity criterion of self-defense and was 
more restrictive temporally. Employing the same term differently created confu-
sion regarding the availability of air support in TIC situations, especially when US 
and NATO forces were supporting each other. It also created an impression that 
the US forces were quick to pull the trigger. As one ambassador in the country told 
Human Rights Watch, "[slome Afghans think the US is worse than the Russians. 
The problem is in the TI C they call in air support in a hurry, and special forces go 
too far on the ground and call in airstrikes too often. There is a cultural problem 
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with the US-they are cowboys. ' '96 Since counterinsurgencies seek support of the 
population, such perceptions, whether correct or not, prove costly. 
Finally, the mere notion of a self-defense rule of engagement is misplaced in 
armed conflicts. This is so not only because combatants are always lawful targets, 
but also due to the fact that the concept of direct participation already permits en-
gaging anyone who is attacking or about to attack. The debate over the scope of di-
rect participation has no bearing in this regard; all sides agree that acts which 
constitute a hostile act or a demonstration of hostile intent in the self-defense sense 
qualify as acts of direct participation. The controversy over the "for such time" cri-
terion is equally irrelevant, since the term undeniably includes the period when an 
attack is imminent or under way (the self-defense period). 
Consequently, the only legally relevant circumstance for self-defense during an 
armed conflict is defense against those who do not meet the scope requirements of 
direct participation, specifically that requiring a belligerent nexus to the hostilities. 
Expanding self-defense beyond such situations by giving it a central role in engage-
ment guidance was, therefore, unusual as an operational matter and unnecessary 
as a matter of law. Doing so represented yet another policy and operational deci-
sion ratcheting back what was allowed by international humanitarian law. 
Concluding Thoughts 
What is fascinating about the application of tHl in Afghanistan (and other recent 
conflicts) is that its foundational premise seems to have been turned on its head. 
International humanitarian law is designed fo r classic attrition warfare, where each 
side tries to so wear down the enemy forces that they can no longer continue fight-
ing. The S1. Petersburg Declaration principle that law fixes the "limits at which the 
necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity" comported 
neatly with warfare along such lines.97 Both sides sought to avoid excessive restric-
tions on their military actions, but both also wanted to ensure the protection of 
their civilian populations. Military necessity and civilian hann were counterpoised 
In a zero-sum game. 
However, this traditional balance began to be stressed by the emergence of coer-
cive warfare, in which the objective is not to defeat the enemy, but rather to affect a 
decisionmaker's calculations. NATO's air campaign in 1999 (Operation Allied 
Force), during which the goal was to convince Slobodan Milosevic to stop slaugh-
tering the Kosovar Albanians and return to the negotiating table, best illustrates 
coercive warfare in the contemporary context.98 The dilemma was that some of 
those assets, the destruction of which would most effectively have such effects 
(such as property owned by the State's leader), qualified as protected civilian 
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property under international humanitarian law. The ensuing calls for a relaxation 
of the lex lata should have come as no surprise.99 
Counterinsurgency warfare, in that it seeks to win hearts and minds, constitutes 
"persuasive" warfare, that is, warfare designed to influence the population of the 
State in which an insurgency is under way, and, to a lesser extent, international 
public and governmental opinion. Since collateral damage hinders military opera-
tions by undercutting domestic and international support and by increasing insur-
gent strength, strict compliance with IHL norms actually complements military 
necessity. Accordingly, as in Afghanistan, counterinsurgent forces often adopt re-
strictions on their operations that far outstrip those found in the law. Humanitar-
ians and counterinsurgency warfighters paradoxically find themselves in lockstep. 
Their perspectives on the practices may, nevertheless, conflict. Although the re-
strictions originate as context-specific operational and policy choices, humanitari-
ans tend to style them as normative. As a matter of law, the crux of the issue is 
whether such restrictions comprise State practice bearing on the emergence of cus-
tomary international law norms. 
The ICRe's Customary International Humanitarian Law study notes that "both 
physical and verbal acts of States constitute practice that contributes to the creation 
of customary international law. Physical acts include, for example, battlefield be-
havior. ... Verbal acts include military manuals ... instructions to armed and secu-
rity forces, military communiques during war .... "100 But what must be emphasized 
is that State practice matures into customary law only when it evidences opitlio 
juris sive necessitatis, a belief on the part of States engaging in said practice that it is 
legally obligatory.10i Clearly, the extensive restrictions placed on US and coalition 
forces in Afghanistan did not result from legal concerns, but rather apprehension 
that even legal collateral damage would prove counterproductive in the specific 
context of Afghanistan. In other words, they did not rise to the level of State prac-
tice which would evidence the emergence of international humanitarian law 
norms more restrictive than those already extant. 
Be that as it may, warfighters, commentators andjudge advocates often conllate 
the distinction between humanitarian law and rules of engagement (and other en-
gagement mandates). The latter include not only elements of law, but also opera-
tional and policy dictates. Because ROE are the actual norms applicable on a 
battlefield, many observers lose sight of the difference, thereby distorting assess-
ments of State practice.102 One can imagine that the CDEM process, for instance, 
might foster expectations that greater collateral damage requires a higher level of 
approval authority. Similarly, the LIT concept risks suggesting that there is no lon-
ger any military necessity in declaring combatants hostile, as permitted in IHL. 
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Ultimately, the conduct of hostilities in Afghanistan illustrated a shift from law 
toward legitimacy. As governments, non-governmental organizations, academics 
and others raise expectations, there is decreasing emphasis on strict legal analysis. 
In Afghanistan, for instance, authorization to conduct attacks which would oth-
erwise comport with the proportionality principle was sometimes denied as risk-
ing "bad press" or negative communicative consequence. The requirement to 
take feasible precautions in attack seems to be slowly slipping toward a standard 
of all possible precautions. 
Clearly, law is playing a lesser role in targeting than it has in past conflicts. This 
lesson has not been lost on enemy forces, who increasing employ lawfare-the use 
oflaw as a "weapon" employed to create the impression, correct or not, that an op-
ponent acts lawlessly, thereby undercutting support for the war effort. IOl in the face 
of this strategy, there is even greater motivation for operating at levels of caution 
far exceeding the IHL's mandates. But doing so only exacerbates the blurring ofle-
gal, policy and operational practices. 
Prosecuting a conflict to the limit of the law to prevent erosion of the military 
necessity aspect ofinternational humanitar ian law is self-evide ntly not the answer. 
At least in a counterinsurgency doing so would sacrifice victory on the altar of prin-
ciple. Nevertheless, rules of engagement and other targeting restrictions should be 
crafted in a way that reflects the content, structure, function and accepted termi-
nology of this body of law. Afghanistan should serve as a warning that understand-
ing and comm unicating the difference between law, on the one hand, and 
operational and policy choices, on the other, remains imperative. 
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available at http://www.michaelschmitt.orglimages!Manual%5BI%5D.Final.BriU .. pdf [herein. 
after NIAC Manuall. 
6. This is the position taken by the International Committee of the Red Cross (JCRC). See 
IHL and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, supra note 3, at 8. However, some 
experts see a continuing international armed conflict, existing beside the non-international one, 
with AI Qaeda and related transnational terrorist groups. 
7. AP 1, supra note 1, art. 48. In the Tadiccase, the In ternational Criminal Tribunal for the 
fonner Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber held that the principle of distinction, which lies at the heart 
of the law of targeting, applies in non-international armed conflict. By the decision, customary 
rules had developed to govern Uinternal strife," covering 
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such areas as protection of civilians from hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate 
attacks, protection of civilian objecrs, in particular cultural property, protection of all 
those who do not (or no longer) take active part in hostilities, as well as prohibition of 
means of warfare proscribed in international armed conflicts and ban of certain 
methods of conducting hostilities. 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT ·94·1, Decision on Defence Motion for lnterlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction para. 127 (O;.:t. 2, 1995). The Tribunal ci ted General Assembly Resolution 2444, 
which recognized the Unecessityof applying basic hwnanitarian principles in aI/armed confliCL " 
Id., para. 110, citing G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII), U.N. Doc. AJ7218 (Dec. 19, 1968), Respect for 
Human Rights in Armed Conflicts. reprinted ill THE LAWS Of ARMED CONfLICt" 511 (Dietrich 
Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 20(4). The United States later recognized the Resolution as 
Kdeclara tory of existing customary international law." Letter from J. Fred Buzhardt, General 
Counselofthe Department of Defense , to Senator Edward Kennedy (Sept. 22, 1972), excerpted in 
A. Rovine, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relllting to lTJternational Law, 67 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 118, 122 (1973). See also NIAC Manual, supra 
note 5, at 11; CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 25-29 (Rule 7 and 
accompanying commentary) (Jean·Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) 
(hereinafter CIHLS]; COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS Of 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE 
GE.NEVA CONVENTIONS Of 12 AUGUST 1949 para. 4761 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & 
Bruno Zimmennann eds., 1987) (hereinafter AP I Commentary]. 
8. The USArmy has cited complexity as a major factor in future operations. In particular, it 
points to three especially relevant manifestations: complex physical terrain, complex human ter-
rain and complex infonnational terrain. 
In the face of overwhelming U.S. combat power, future adversaries can be expected to 
conduct operations more frequently from the shelter of complex physical terrain (urban, 
jungle/forest, and mountain). Such terrain typically comprises a mosaic of open 
patches and highly restrictive terrain, with the potential to minimize exposure to 
superior firepower, inflict higher U.S. casualties, and prolong the conflict. Urban 
defenses, in particular, will tend to reduce U.S. advantages in overhead information 
collection, tactical mobility, and long-range precision fires, instead placing a premium 
on dismounted maneuver, direct fires, ground reconnaissance, HUMINT, and the 
troop strength needed to conduct them. 
An urban setting also invites adversaries to exploit public sensitivities to collateral 
damage and civilian casualties, and tends to magnify the perceived cosrs of protracted 
conflict ... . 
Complex human terrain exisrs where numerous population groups coexist in the same 
physical space-often a city or an urbanized area. These might include ethno-linguistic 
groups, political factions, tribes or clans, religious seers, or ideological movemenrs. 
Identification of combatants in complex human terrain is extraordinarily difficult; 
applying force in such an environment imposes a high risk of counterproductive or 
unintended consequences. 
Finally, complex informational terrain is the multiple sources or transmission paths for 
communications, data, or information-including news media. A force operating in 
complex informational terrain will not have the ability to control information flow. 
U.s. Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pam. 525·3·0, The Army in Joint 
Operations: The Anny's Future Force Capstone Concept 2015-2024, at 44 (2005). 
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9. For a general description of Afghanistan, see Central InteUigence Agency, The World 
Factbook, Afghanistan (2008), https://www.cia.govllibrary/publicationslthe.world-factbookl 
geoslaf.html (last visited Mar. 11,2(09). 
10. This approach reversed the standard tactic of ground forces driving the enemy into areas 
where it can be attacked by airpower. In Afghanistan, air attacks often did the opposi te, with air 
forces driving the enemy into areas where it could be engaged by ground forces. 
II. ~ An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through 
use of subversion and armed conflict." Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication I· 
02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Tenns (Apr. 12,2001, as amended through Oct. 17, 
2008), http://www.dtic.miVdoctrine/jeVdoddictl [hereinafter 000 Dictionary]. Security Coun· 
cil resolutions setting forth mandates on Afghanistan illustrate the counterinsurgency nature of 
operations. See, e.g., S.c. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RESI1386 (Dec. 20, 2001); S.c. Res. 1413, U.N. 
Doc. S/RfS/1413 (May 20, 2002); S.c. Res. 1444, U.N. Doc. S/RESI1444 (Nov. 20, 2002); S.c. 
Res. 1510, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1510 (Oct. 13,2003); S.c. Res. 1563, U.N. Doc. S/RfS/1563 (Sept. 
17,2004); S.c. Res. 1623, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1623 (Sept. 13,2005); S.c. Res. 1659, U.N. Doc. S/ 
RESI1659 (Feb. 15,2006); S.c. Res. 1707, U.N. Doc. S/RfS/1707 (Sept. 12,2(06); S.c. Res. 1746, 
U.N. Doc. S/RfS/1746 (Mar. 23, 2007); S.c. Res. 1776, U.N. Doc. S/RfSI1776 (Sept. 19,2007); 
S.c. Res. 1817, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1817 (June II, 2008); S.c. Res. 1833, U.N. Doc. S/RFSI1833 
(Sept. 22, 2008). 
12. US Marine Corps & US Special Operations Command, Multi-Service Concept for Irreg. 
ular Warfare Version 2.0, USMC Combat Development Command and US Special Operations 
Command Center for Knowledge and Futures, at 5-6 (2006), Ilvaililbleat http://www.dtic.miV 
cgi·biniGetTRDoc?AD=ADA454228&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
13. Headquarters, Department of the Army & Headquarters, Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, at 1·141-1-142 (2006), 
available at http://www.usgcoin.orgllibrary/doctrine!COIN-FM3·24.pdf [hereinafter COIN 
Manual]. The manual was drafted in part by General David Petraeus, who presently commands 
US Central Command (CENTCOM). The command exercises responsibility over the conflicts 
in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 
14. [d. at I-ISO. 
15. Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, at II-I 
(2006, incorporating change I (Feb. 13,2008)), available at http://www.dtic.miVdoctrine/jel! 
new_pubsljp3_0.pdf. 
16. Headquarters, Air Force Doctrine Center, AFDD 2-1 .9, Targeting, at 35 (2006), available 
at http://www.dtic.miVdoctrine/jeUservice_pubslafdd2_1_9.pdf [hereinafter AFDD 2-1.9]. The 
target validation phase ensures vetted targets 
achieve the effects and objectives outl ined in a commander-'s guidance and are 
coordinated and deconflicted with agencies and activities that might present a conflict 
with the proposed action. It also determines whether a target remains a viable element 
of the target system. During the development effort, the targets may also require review 
and approval based on the sensitive target approval and review process, coordinated 
through the combatant commander 10 national authorities. 
[d. at 34. 
17. The CDEM methodology is set forth in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, qCSM 
316O.0I B, Joint Methodology for Estimating CoUateral Damage and Casualties for Conven· 
tional Weapons: Precision, Unguided and Cluster (Aug. 31, 2007) . Thedocumentis"ForOffi· 
cial Use Only" and unavailable to the public. For open-source discussions of the topic, see 
Colin H. Kahn, Boots on the Ground or Bolts from the Blue? Risks to Civilians from U.S. 
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Counterinsurgency Operations in Iraq and Afghanis tan 3-4 (unpublished memo prepared for 
the Cornell University «Human Rights at War'" Workshop, Nov. 9-10, 2007); DWIGHT A. 
ROBl YER, BEYOND PRECISION: ISSUES OF MORALITY AND DECISION MAKING IN MINIMIZING 
COLLATERAL CASUALTIES, PAPER FOR THE PROGRAM IN ARMS CONTROl, DISARMAMENT, AND 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 18 (2003), available at http://acdis.illinois.edu/assetsJdocsl246/ 
BeyondPrecisionlssuesofMoralityandDecisionMakinginMinimizingCollateralCasualties.pdf. 
18. I Center for Law and Military Operations, Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and 
School, Lessons Learned from Afghanistan and Iraq, Major Combat Operations (II September 
2001-1 May 2003), at 84 (2004) [hereinafter I Lessons Learned] . 
19. TheCENTCOM CDEM for both Operation EnduringFreedom and Operation Iraqi Free· 
dom is illustrative. It sets forth a series of q uestions to be addressed during the CDEM process: 
1. Can I positively identify the object or person I want to attack as a legitimate military 
target authorized for attack by the current rules of engagement? 
2. Is there a protected facility (i .e. No Strike), civilian object or people, or significant 
environmental concern within the effects range of the weapon I would like to use to 
attack the target? 
3. Can I avoid damage to that concern by attacking the target with a different weapon 
or with a different method of approach? 
4. If not, how many people do I think will be injured/killed by my attack? 
5. Do I need to call my higher commander for permission to attack this target! 
Id. at 103, citing US Central Command, Collateral Damage Estimation Policy and Methodology 
para. 2 (2003). 
20. However, the law of targeting contains many unresolved issues. On some of them, see 
Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 131 (Susan Breau & Elizabeth Wilmshurst eds., 2007); Michael 
N. Schmitt, Fault LilIes in the Law of AttlUk, in TESfING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAw 277 (Susan Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006). 
21. AP I, supra note I, art . 51; CIHLS, supra note 7, ch. I; US Navy, Marine Corps & Coast 
Guard, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-
12.l/COMDTPUB P5800.7 A paras. 8.2.1, 8.2.2 (2007) (hereinafter NWP I-14M]; UK MINlSfRY 
OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAw OF ARMED CONFLICT para. 5.32 (2004) (hereinafter 
British Manual]; NlAC Manual, supra note 5, Rules 2.1 .1, 2.1.1.1 & 2.1 .1.2. 
22. AP I, supra note I, art. 52.2. UNature~ denotes intrinsic military significance, thereby in-
cluding objects like ammunition depots, tanks, combat aircraft, headquarters or military bar-
racks. "Location'" refers to areas that have uspecial importance to military operations." The 
classic example is a mountain pass that can be blocked to foil the enemy's advance. When reliable 
in telligence or other information indicates that the enemy intends to use an object mili tarily in 
the future, the object q ualifies as a military objective through "purpose." Finally, "use" means 
that the enemy is presently utilizing an object militarily. AP I Commentary, supra note 7, paras. 
2020-24. See also British Manual, supra note 21, para. 4.4. 
23. AP I, supra note 1, art . 51.3: "'Civilians shal l enjoy the protection afforded by th is5ection, 
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities." See also CIHLS, supra note 7, at 
19 (Rule 6); NWP I-14M, supra note 21, para. 8.2.2; British Manual , supra note 21, para. 5.3.2. 
24. AP I, supra note I, arts. 51 .4(a) & 51.5(a). See also CIHLS, supra note 7, at 37 (Rule II), 
40 (Rule 12),43 (Rule 13); British Manual , supra note 21, para. 5.24. 
25. ClHLS, supra note 7, at 244 (Rule 71). SeE also AP I, supra note I, arts. 51.4(b) & (c); 
NWP I-14M, supra note 21, para. 9.1.2; British Manual, supra note 21, para. 6.4. 
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26. ClHLS,supra note 7,at237 (Rule 70). See also AP I,supra note I ,art. 35.2; NWP I-14M, 
supra note 21, para. 9.1.1; British Manual, supra note 21, para. 6.2. 
27. Convention on Cluster Munitions, May 30, 2008, available at http://www.icrc.orglihl 
.nsflFUW620?OpenDocument. 
28. NWP I-14M, supra note 21, para. 8.3.1. The requirement is codified in AP I, supra note 
I, art. 57. See also CIHLS, supra note 7, ch. 5; British Manual, supra note 21, para. 5.32. 
29. AP I,supra note I ,arts. 51.5(b) &57.2(b);ClHLS,supra note7,ch. 4; NWP 1-14M,supra 
note 21, para. 8.3.1; British Manual, supra note 21, paras. 2.6-2.8. 
30. The commentary to Article 51 suggests tha t damage which is "extensive" is not propor· 
tionate. AP I Commentary, supra note 7, para. 1980. See discussion in DINSl"EIN, supra note 4, at 
120-21. 
31. For a discussion of the incidents, see Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of tire 
United States Relating to International Law, 96 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 
237,247 (2002). 
32. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TROOPS IN CONTACf 22 (2008) (hereinafter TROOPS IN 
CONTAcrJ, citing e-mail communication from NATO Media Operations Center to Human 
Rights Watch (May6, 2008). 
33. Id. at 14. 
34. Karzai Denounces Reported Civilian Deaths&om U.S., NATO Raids, Online NewsHour 
(May 2, 2007), http://www.pbs.orgfnewshourlupdates/asiaijan-june07/afghanista~05-02.htm!. 
35. Headquarters United States Air Force, Operation Anaconda: An Airpower Perspective 
42-43 (2005), available at http://www.af.milJsharedJmediaidocumentlAFD·060726·037.pdf. 
36. "Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and 
limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement 
with other forces encountered.» DoD Dictionary, supra note II. 
37. "A folde r, hardcopy or electronic, containing target intelligence and related materials 
prepared for planning and executing action against a specific target. ~ [d. 
38. "A plan for a connected series of joint air operations to achieve the joint force com· 
mander's objectives wi thin a given time and joint operational area.» [d. 
39. "An order to initiate military operations as directed." Jd. 
40. "An abbrevia ted form of an operation order issued as needed after an operation order to 
change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order." [d. 
41. "A measure employed by land or amphibious commanders to facilitate the rapid engage· 
ment of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces." [d. 
42. A card distributed to soldiers bearing simple rules regarding the use of force and other 
matters. 
43. I Lessons Learned, supra note 18, at 86-88. Sugenerally AFDD 2-1.9, supra note 16, at 
94-95. 
44. AP I,supra note I,art. 51.3; ClHLS,supra note 7, at 19 (Rule6); NWP I-14M, supra note 
21, para. 8.2.2; British Manual ,supra note 21, para. 5.3.2. See also the reports of meetingsofa group 
of international experts advising the JCRC on interpretive guidance regarding the notion of direct 
participation, available at http://www.ciet.orglWeb/Englsiteengo.nsflhtmlali/participation 
-hostilities-ihl-311205. The guidance will be issued in 2009. 
45. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights issued what is 
effectively a model standard in 1990. The Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Fireanns by 
Law Enforcement Officials provides that 
(Ilaw enforcement officials shall not use fireanns against persons except in self-defense 
or defense of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent 
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the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a 
person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her 
escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. In 
any event, in tentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly 
unavoidable in order to protect life. 
U.N. Doc. AfCONF.I44/28/Rev.l, provo 9 (1990), al'ai/ab/eat hnp:/lwww.unhchr.chlhtmlJmenuJ/ 
blh_comp43.htm. On this and other use·of·force standards, see Michael N. Schmitt, Targeted 
Killings in International Law: Law Enforcement, Self·Defense and Armed Conflict, in 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAw: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 525 (Roberta Arnold & Noelle Quenivert eds., 20(8). 
46. Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, qCS13121 .01 B, Standing Rules of Engagement for 
US Forces, encl. A, paras. 2a & 3a (2005). A hostile act is Han attack or other use of force against 
the United States, US forces or other designated persons or property.~ Hostile intent is "the 
threat of imminent use of force" against the same entities.ld., paras. 31' & f. 
47. Various interviews with US military personnel with Operation Iraqi Freedom experience 
(May-Aug. 2008). 
48. E·mail to author (June 17, 2008) (on file with author). 
49. I Lessons Learned, supra note 18, at 100-102 and accompanying footnotes. 
5{). 2 Center for Law and Mili tary Operations, Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and 
School, Lessons Learned from Afghanistan and Iraq, Full Spectrum Operations (2 May 2003-
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51. I Lessons Learned, supra note 18, at 96. 
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declared hostile, as well as other U.S. Standing ROE concepts, and was certain as to their 
ability to implement them in any context; however, on its face, "likely and identifiable 
threat" appeared to beg further elaboration and clarification. 
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Lessons Learned, supra note 18, at 100 n.77, citing Staff Judge Advocate, 26th Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), After Action Report: Operation Enduring 
Freedom/Operation Swift Freedom (Mar. 22, 20(2). Similar frustrations were expressed by 
others, including US Army judge advocates. Id. 
55. fd. at 106 n.91, citing Memorandum, Dean L. Whitford, fanner Group Judge Advocate, 
5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Staff Judge Advocate, Joint Special Operations Task Force-
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Deputy Director, CLAMO, subject: Task Force Dagger OEF/OIF ROE AAR (June 14,2004). 
56. Id. at 100, citing Major ThomasA. Wagoner, Staff Judge Advocate, 15th Marine Expedi-
tionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), After Action Report of the 15th MEU(SOC) West 
PacOI (2002). 
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perts participating in lhe ICRC effort to produce In terpretive Guidance on the Notion ofDirtct 
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535-36 (2005). The Israeli Supreme Court addressed the issue in Public Committee Against Tor-
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64. NWP I-14M , supra note 21, para. 8.2.2. Note lhat the Uni ted States does not see the 
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US DEPARTMENT Of DEfENSE, FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: CONOUer Of THE PERSIAN GULf 
WAR 616 (I992). 
65. AP I, supra note 1, art. SO.I . 
66. AP I Commentary, supra note 7, para. 1921. 
67. Statement made by the United Kingdom at timeof ratification, reprinted in DocUMENTS 
ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note I, at 510-11. 
68. ClHLS, supra note 7, at 24. 
69. Author interview with judge advocate responsible for providing legal advice in such si tu-
ations (May 2008). 
70. Operation Anaconda, supra note 35, at 40. 
71. Anaconda was the first operation to involve significant USconventional ground forces. 
72. AP I, supra note 1, art. 57. 
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75. AP I, supra note I, art. 51.7; CI HLS, supra note 7, at 337 (Rule 97); NWP I-14M, supra 
note 21, para. 8.3.2; British Manual, supra note 21, para. 15.14.2; NIAC Manual, supra note 5, 
para. 2.3.8. 
76. But see DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 131, arguing that "the test of excessive injury must be 
relaxed." 
77. AP I, supra note I, art . 51.8. On human shields, see generally Michael N. Schmitt, Human 
Shields and International Humanitarian LAw, 38 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RlGHTS 17 
(2008). 
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79. In tenns of the quantum of advantage, the ICRC Commentary notes that «it is not legiti-
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mentary, supra note 7, para. 2024. 
80. See DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 8.5---$6; Schmitt, Fault Lines, supra note 20, at 295. 
81. The small-diameter bomb is a guided munition that relies on the Global Positioning Sys-
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sive force that would otherwise be required to ensure destruction of the target. Its small size 
(currently in the 250 lb. class) reduces the likelihood of collateral damage. Factsheet, GBU-39B 
Small Diameter Bomb, Air Force Link, http://www.af.millfuctsheets/fuctsheet.asp?id=45oo 
(last visited Mar. 11,2009). An upgrade replaces the steel casing with a composite casing to 
reduce the fragmen tation effects of the weapon. Small Diameter Bomb/Small Smart Bomb, 
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86. Id. at 30. 
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90. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices 
art. 3(1), Oct. 10, 1980, as amended May 3, 1996,2048 U.N.T.S. 133, reprinted in DocUMENTS 
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attack. 
92. See definitions at note 46 supra. 
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Message (S) 212315Z NOV aI, para. 3.H, and, for Operation Iraqi Freedom, USCENTCOM 
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